This gives a novel explanation for the ambiguity of empirical results surrounding mechanism selection. If sellers expend as much resources optimising within a mechanism because they do choosing which mechanism to implement, empiricists should witness roughly the same outcomes whichever of the pay-as-bid or uniform-price auctions is implemented.
Understanding bidder behaviour in divisible-good pay-as-bid auctions is very important to the debate over which of the pay-as-bid or uniform-price auctions ought to be implemented used, and these auction formats are accustomed to allocate trillions of dollars of goods annually. Realizing that equilibrium actions are well-defined, and they may have a tractable closed-form representation shows that structural empirical studies of auctions can correctly infer unobserved outcomes of the pay-as-bid auction. The recent work discussed above presents a rich group of results that may empower policy decisions in valuable markets.
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